It is the most violent form of international relations in the event that disputes that lead to crises in international relations cannot be resolved by peaceful means, especially diplomatic initiatives, mediation and arbitration, or by sanctions such as retaliation, blockade, economic embargo. According to the modern doctrine of the law of states, war, which is defined as “an armed struggle between two or more states within the framework of the rules stipulated by the law of states in order to impose their will on each other in line with the interests of the parties and within the framework of the rules stipulated by the law of states”, has a different ground when it comes to Islamic tradition and law. According to both historical and modern perspectives, the jurists perceived war as the final remedy to fight against the forces that threaten the security of the Islamic country and Muslims and prevent the last religion sent by Allah Almighty to realise the absolute benefit of all mankind from reaching people and to make every effort for this purpose. Since it is very different from other definitions of war in terms of its goal and nature, Islamic jurists have mostly used the term jihād instead of other words in the Arabic language expressing armed conflict, and have expressed it with the qualification “in the way and for the sake of Allah” (fī sebīlillah) in order to distinguish it from the negative aims of other wars such as invasion, exploitation, oppression and persecution. The fact that normative regulations pertaining to international relations, including armed conflicts, are usually grouped under the term jihad or siyar in the fiqh literature is also a result of this difference in perspective. However, in both religious texts and fiqh literature, words such as harb (al-Ma’ida 5/64; al-Anfāl 8/57; Muhammad 47/4) and qisāl (al-Baqarah 2/190-191, 193; al-Nisā 4/74-76; al-Tawbah 9/12-13) and their derivatives are also used for war, which means “armed conflict between two communities”.

Since the first periods in human history when independent political organisations were established and societies established relations with each other, hostile attitudes have come to the agenda on the axis of conflicts of interest, power balances and religious-ideological reasons. This situation is actually an internationalised form of a phenomenon of enmity that is inherent in human nature and first emerged between the sons of Adam (al-Baqarah 2/36; al-Ma’idah 5/27-31; al-A’rāf 7/24; Bukhārī, “Jannāʾiz”, 33). In Ibn Khaldūn’s words, war is as old as human history and is a natural development (Muqaddimah, II, 37). The activities to take other societies under their sovereignty, to seize their wealth and riches, to exploit them, and to prevent the divine message from reaching people have always continued throughout history, and the struggle between right and wrong has always existed (al-Kahf 18/56; al-Mu’min 40/5; Muhammad 47/3); therefore, in Islam, armed struggle has been accepted as legitimate after a certain stage in order to prevent exploitation and oppression and to ensure the peace of humanity. In the Holy Qur’an, the purpose of legitimacy in this sense is pointed out as follows: “If Allah had not fought some people against others, the order of the world would have been disturbed” (al-Baqarah 2/251); “If Allah had not fought some people against others, monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques in which Allah’s name is frequently mentioned would have been destroyed” (al-Hajj 22/40). Although the very first sentence of the United Nations Charter states, “The United Nations is determined to protect future generations from the scourge of war, which twice in one human lifetime has caused unspeakable suffering to mankind”, the reality of war continues to this day. This is because the balance of power plays an important role in international relations today as it did in the past, there are no sanctions to prevent the desires of the great powers who want to achieve their interests by force, and the institutions in charge of ensuring international peace cannot be effective enough due to various pressures and directives.

According to Islam, war is not for the purpose of gaining profit and exploitation with the motive of expansionism, but for the purpose of eliminating hostile attempts against religion and believers, establishing the necessary environment for peace, preventing those who disrupt this environment, punishing them if necessary, and ultimately securing fundamental rights and freedoms (al-Anfal 8/39, 47, 56-57, 61; al-Qasas 28/77, 83). The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him), while condemning the wars fought for the sake of obtaining booty or satisfying the feelings of heroism or achieving fame (Musnad, IV, 402; Bukhārī, “Jihād”, 15; Muslim, “Imāra”, 149), also pointed out the ground on which the idea of war should be based. In line with the principle of gradualism, which is one of the main features of the Qur’an regarding legal regulations, it is seen that there was a process of development in terms of provisions related to war. War was not permitted in the Meccan period due to the small number and power of the Muslims despite the tortures they were subjected to (Qurtubi, XII, 69; Taqiyy al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 59-60; Ibn Kathir, I, 414). Jassas says that there was a consensus on the prohibition of hot confrontation in the period before the Hijrah, and that this ruling was based on the statement “Good and evil are not the same. Prevent evil with a better behaviour” (Fussilat 41/34); “Nevertheless, forgive them and pay no attention to them” (al-Ma’idah 5/13); “Your duty is only to announce; it is for Us to settle the account” (al-Ra’d 13/40) and some other verses. An incident narrated from Ibn ‘Abbas shows that the prohibition of war continued for a while after the migration. When ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Awf and his relatives, whose property remained in Mecca, came to the Prophet and said, “We were rich and respected when we were polytheists, but after we became Muslims we have become poor, is war not allowed?”, the Messenger of Allah said, “I have been commanded to forgive, do not fight the Meccans” (al-Nasāʾī, “Jihād”, 1; Ahmad b. Husayn al-Bayhaqakī, IX, 11).

The Muslims, who could not get rid of the oppression and attacks of the polytheists despite leaving Mecca, were given the opportunity to respond to the enemy with weapons with the verse of the Hajj Surah, which was revealed in the first year of the Hijrah, which reads, “Those who were attacked were given permission to fight because they were subjected to oppression” (22/39). The permission to fight back was turned into an obligation with the following verse: “Fight those who wage war against you in the cause of Allah, but do not go to extremes” (al-Baqarah 2/190). This command, which makes war obligatory in case of attack, was initially directed only against the polytheists of Quraysh, but later on it included the Ahl al-Bayt who collaborated with them against the Muslims (al-Tawbah 9/29) and the other tribes in the Arabian peninsula (al-Tawbah 9/36) (for the process of the revelation of the verses, see. Tirmidhi, “Tafsīr”, 22; Shāfiʿī, Aḥkām al-Ḳurʾān, p. 351; al-Jessās, I, 257; Ahmad b. Husayn al-Bayhaqakī, IX, 10-13; Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī, I, 102; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, III, 7; Özel, pp. 42-44). In this process, it is clear that war was seen as an obligation required by the right of legitimate defence in order to protect the Islamic faith and Muslim society. With the verse, “Will you not fight against the people who have broken their covenant, who have decided to expel the prophet, and who attacked you first?” (al-Tawbah 9/13), and “Do not wish to meet the enemy; ask Allah for peace. But when you meet the enemy, be patient and know that Paradise is under the shadow of swords” (Muslim, “Jihâd”, 20; Abu Dawood, “Jihâd”, 89) confirms this determination. This understanding of warfare, which aims to protect human rights and freedoms, especially the right to life and bodily integrity, and to prevent all kinds of injustice, gives Muslims the right and duty to fight their enemies when appropriate conditions arise.

In spite of this conceptual expansion and historical facts, some Western scholars have abstracted Islam’s understanding of war from its basic purpose and meaning of ensuring justice and eliminating injustice, and have presented it as a holy war that ensures the continuous expansion of Dar al-Islam against Dar al-Harb al-Harb, and envisages the continuation of this until the whole world becomes Muslim and submits to Islamic sovereignty (Khadduri, pp. 45, 52, 144, 202; Selected Works, pp. 72-73; Goldziher, pp. 27, 106; Schacht, p. 130; Kruse, p. 170). This approach, which centres on the term jihad, is based on the distinct nature of the conflicts between the Crusades and the Muslims who opposed them, and the unfriendly relations between the social orders (Abd al-Hamīd Aḥmad Abū Sulaymān, p. 47). In fact, the Crusaders, at the instigation of the popes, constantly organised attacks on the Islamic world, and in order to recruit soldiers, they claimed that if the Muslims could not be destroyed, they would be forced to convert to Islam or be killed. As a matter of fact, Pope Urban II declared a holy war against Islam in the person of the Seljuks, whom he characterised as the barbarian race of Asia (Armstrong, p. 1). However, Islam recognised freedom of religion and conscience in the broadest sense, did not find it right to practice faith under pressure (al-Baqarah 2/256; Yûnus 10/99; al-Kahf 18/29), and did not see war, which essentially leads to hatred and hatred, as a means of preaching.

The Legitimacy of War in Fiqh Doctrine. Although the mujtahids of the classical period generally seem to have based international relations on the basis of war (Yaman, International Relations in Islamic Law, p. 111 et al.), this should be evaluated within the framework of the conditions of their own times, when there was no international law approved by the existing states and war played a decisive role in mutual relations, and should be understood as not adopting a permanent state of peace that would result in the inability to fulfil this duty in the face of hostile behaviour that would prevent the activity of announcing Allah’s final message to others. Because according to one of the views attributed to Imam Shafi’i by the majority of the Hanafi, Mālikī, Hanbalī and Ja’farī sects, the main justification for war is hostile behaviour and non-recognition of freedom of religion. In other words, the actual hostility of the other side towards Islam and Muslims and the restriction of the freedom to promote and live Islam are the main reasons for war. According to the minority Shafi’i and Zâhirî sects and some Mâlikî and Hanbalî jurists, the cause of war is disbelief, that is, not adopting Islam as a religion (Özel, pp. 50-57; Yaman, International Relations in Islamic Law, pp. 111-127).

In many verses of the Holy Qur’an, and especially in the first verse authorising war, it is clearly stated that the reason for war is the enemy’s attack on Muslims and their expulsion from their homes (al-Haj 22/39-40), “Fight those who wage war against you for the sake of Allah, but do not go to extremes”; “Fight them until there is no more Fitnah (oppression and tyranny) and only Allah is served; but if they desist, there is no enmity against those except those who commit wrongdoing” (al-Baqarah 2/190, 193); “Fight the polytheists as they fight you” (al-Tawbah 9/36); “Therefore We made it known to the Children of Israel that whoever kills a human being, except as a punishment for murder or for causing corruption in the land, is as if he had killed all mankind, and whoever saves a life is as if he had saved all mankind” (al-Ma’idah 5/32); “(al-Ankabût 29/46); “Allah does not forbid you to treat with kindness and justice those who do not fight you in religion or drive you out of your homes . .. Allah only forbids you from befriending those who fight you in religion and drive you out of your homes and help you to drive them out; whoever befriends them are the true wrongdoers” (al-Mumtahanah 60/8-9). Likewise, the verses prohibiting the killing of civilians and religious scholars who do not personally participate in the war (al-Shawkānī, VIII, 71 et al.) and the verse stipulating that a war fought for legitimate reasons will be terminated if the enemy accepts the rule of Muslims by preserving his own faith (al-Tawbah 9/29) show that the criterion of legitimacy of war is not the other side’s adoption of Islam (kufr). On the other hand, the basic principle in Islam that human beings are essentially innocent and the shedding of their blood is forbidden (Abdullah b. Mahmūd al-Mawsili, V, 28; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I, 11) and the statements of the jurists reflecting the understanding that war is not considered intrinsically good (al-Qāsānī, VII, 100; Najīb al-Armanāzī, p. 75; Özel, p. 48) confirm this view.

It is understood that the minority of jurists, who attributed the legitimacy of war to the other side’s being a disbeliever, generalised the verses and hadiths related to war by removing them from their context under the influence of the international conditions of their time. Those who held this view gave the meaning of “shirk and disbelief” to the word fitna in the verses (al-Baqarah 2/193; al-Anfāl 8/39) that read, “Fight them until there is no more fitna and the religion is wholly Allah’s” (Shāfiʿī, Aḥkām al-Ḳurʾān, p. 390; Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī, I, 99, 109), and accordingly they said that it was a necessity to fight them until they gave up their disbelief. According to them, “When the Haram months are over, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them and imprison them, and watch them in all their places of passage. If they repent, pray and pay zakat, let them go free” (al-Tawbah 9:5), which commands fighting non-Muslims without any condition or time limit. The verse in question, which is called the “verse of the sword” by those who adopt this view, abrogated the other verses that permitted only defensive warfare (al-Jassas, I, 260; Qiyā al-Kharrāsī, IV, 177). One of the evidences put forward by the jurists who accept kufr as a reason for war is the hadith that says, “I am commanded to fight people until they say, ‘There is no god but Allah'” (Bukhārī, “Iman”, 18; Muslim, “Iman”, 32; Abū Dāwūd, “Jihād”, 95; Tirmidhī, “Iman”, 201).

The arguments of this group, which considers war as the main form of international relations, can be criticised both historically and methodologically. The first argument is weakened by the use of the word fitna in the Qur’anic language in the meanings of “violence, coercion, torment, torture and trial” (Rāgıb al-Isfahānī, al-Mufredāt, “ftn” md.). The verse of the sword, on the other hand, was revealed in relation to the polytheists who broke the treaty in terms of time and textual context; it is not possible to extend this ruling to all non-Muslims in terms of context. These and similar verses, which contain the command of war, determine the strategy in the wars that are actually being fought for justifiable reasons. On the other hand, the claim that the verses of war abrogate the verses that emphasise or call for peace contradicts the theory of nullification adopted in fiqh. For, in order to speak of a nullification, there must be a conflict between the texts and there must be no possibility of reconciling them. However, the verses in question here can be compiled because they are related to different situations and conditions. As for the last argument, according to the opinion of the majority, the people in this hadīth are the Arab polytheists who were the Prophet’s interlocutors and who did not stop being hostile to Islam and raping Muslims from the beginning and who constantly broke the treaties (Yahyā b. Ādam, pp. 28-29; Abū Ubayd Kāsim b. Sallām, pp. 34 et al.; Tabari, p. 200). This is because non-Arab polytheists and non-Muslims belonging to the Ahl al-Bayt (Ahl al-Kitab) can retain their religion if they agree to submit to the Islamic state to show that they have renounced their enmity against Muslims (al-Tawbah 9/29; al-Muvaṭṭṭaʾ, “Zakat”, 41-45; Abū Ubayd Kāsim b. Sallām, p. 39; for these two views and their justifications, see also Jihad). JIHAD).

Islam, which places inter-state relations on a certain legal basis, did not find it right to escalate hostile relations for humanitarian and worldly concerns, and condemned wars that were not based on legitimate reasons (al-Baqarah 2/205; al-Anfāl 8/47; al-Nahl 16/92; Bukhārī, “Jihād”, 15; Muslim, “Imāra”, 149). Since the aim of Islamic rulings is to ensure the benefit of people in a balanced way and to establish justice, the principle of justice is also required to prevail in international relations (al-Ma’idah 5/8). Accordingly, the principle of justice is required to prevail in international relations that are for defence purposes only (al-Baqarah 2/190, 194; al-Haj 22/39; al-Shoora 42/41), that are a continuation of a war that was interrupted without concluding with a treaty, that started as a result of the breakdown of the peace treaty by the enemy (al-Tawbah 9/12-13), that aim to help Muslims who have been wronged (al-Nisā 4/75; al-Anfal 8/72), participated in due to obligations arising from international treaties (Shafi’i, al-‘Um, IV, 187), aimed at introducing Islam to people and ensuring freedom of religion and conscience in all its aspects (al-Al-i Imrān 3/110; al-Mā’idah 5/67; al-Tawbah 9/41; al-Hajj 22/78) were considered legitimate, while the others were considered as attempts to create corruption on earth and were condemned (al-Baqarah 2/205; al-Ma’idah 5/65; Muhammad 47/22; Bukhārī, “Jihād”, 15; Muslim, “Imāra”, 149; Abu Dāwūd, “Jihād”, 25). It is essential that wars with the stated legitimacy should end when the goal is reached and should not exceed the mandatory limit.

Law of War. Muslim jurists generally agree that it is obligatory to fight in the case of general mobilisation in the event of an enemy attacking the Islamic country or in the event of imminent danger, and that it is obligatory to fight in other wars. In cases where war is an obligatory duty, in order to undertake this duty, the person must be a Muslim, an adolescent, a free male, free of debts, physically and economically strong, and have the permission of his parents (Bukhārī, “Jihād”, 138; Muslim, “Birr”, 5; Abu Dāwūd, “Jihād”, 31). The debtor has the right of the creditor, the son has the right of the parents, the servant has the right of the employer; women are not liable for war except for mobilisation because they are not deemed fit for war due to their constitution, they also take care of the house and children, minors and those who are mentally and mentally unsound do not bear legal responsibility, and the disabled such as the sick, blind, crippled, etc. are not suitable for this work (al-Tawbah 9/91-93; Ahmad b. Husayn al-Bayhaqakī, IX, 21-26). Although it is possible for anyone who meets these conditions to join the army when necessary, special regular armies have been established since the early periods. Although Mālikī jurists opposed it (Sahnūn, II, 40; Bājī, III, 49), the majority accepted that non-Muslims could also be enlisted in the army in case of need and under certain conditions (Tirmidhī, “Siyar”, 10; Ibn Hazm, XII, 524; Serahsī, Sharḥ al-Siyar al-kabīr, II, 636-637, 687; IV, 1422; Remlī, VIII, 62).

Declaration of War. Since the rules of the law of war will be applied, it is important to determine the beginning of the war. This is possible by declaring the war and making it known to the parties. For this reason, it is explicitly commanded in the Qur’ân al-kerîm to announce the breaking of treaties, if any, with the other side before a war to be waged for legitimate reasons (al-Anfâl 8/58). In connection with this, the Qur’an says, “When you meet the enemy, offer him three options. Whichever of these he chooses, accept it and do not touch them. Call them to convert to Islam first, and if they accept, do not touch them. If they refuse, ask them to pay the jizya; if they respond in the affirmative, accept it and do not touch them. If they do not accept this, then fight them, asking for Allah’s help” (Muslim, “Jihâd”, 3; Abu Dāwūd, “Jihâd”, 82). Islamic jurists agree on the necessity of inviting those who have not received the message of Islam to religion and acceptance of Islamic rule before war. The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which is one of the important sources of today’s law of states, also stated that war must be declared or an ultimatum must be given before it starts (Seviğ, p. 151). In contrast to the modern perception that the relations between the belligerent states would become almost completely hostile with the declaration of war, Islamic law has a more flexible understanding. For example, the citizens of the belligerent state may be allowed to enter and trade in the country provided that they have peaceful purposes; the citizens of the enemy state who are in the Muslim community at the time of the declaration of war may stay until the end of the period of emanation granted to them and return to their country in safety with their property, except for those that can be used for military purposes; trade and customs agreements may remain valid to the extent that they do not benefit the other side; diplomatic relations may continue, even if they do not have permanent status.

Rules of War. Since the rules of belief, worship, law and ethics in Islam are unified in terms of source and goal, Muslim warriors are subjected to certain legal and ethical conditions even in a war environment dominated by psychological tensions. The aforementioned verses, which command not to exceed the limits, and the statements of the Prophet (pbuh) and the practices of the Companions, which enumerate the permissible and forbidden actions during war, constitute the main basis of this approach. With the exception of the attitude of Muslims, it is seen that wars have been fought brutally without any limitations on the personal initiative of commanders and soldiers. So much so that Hugo Grotius, who is known as the founder of the law of states in the West, states in the preface of his work published in 1625 that he had to write such a work because Christian nations follow insane methods that would shame even barbarians in wars and they trample on all kinds of laws originating from God or man during war (Law of War and Peace, p. 11). The introduction of provisions aimed at preventing the killing of non-participants in wars through practices such as torture and rape that violate human dignity and limiting the destruction of war could only be accepted in the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Convention of 1907, except for the Islamic world. However, the provisions of these conventions and subsequent international conventions were not sufficiently reflected in practice because they were deprived of material and moral sanctions due to the fact that powerful states put their own interests above the law and the combatants did not have sufficient moral virtues.

In this framework, the basic rules adopted in Islamic law can be listed as follows: 1. Although there are some exceptions necessitated by the state of war, in general, what is lawful and what is unlawful in the Islamic country is the same in the enemy country where the war is fought (Shafi’i, al-Üm, VII, 322). 2. Since the main goal of war is not to destroy but to render harmless, it is essential to use weapons with limited lethality. However, a verse (al-Anfâl 8/60) shows that in order to ensure deterrence, it is necessary to follow the war technology of the day and to have the weapons of the age. Since this verse does not call for arming oneself for unnecessary and unjustified use, but to deter an enemy who harbours evil intentions, Muslims are obliged to endeavour not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction, even if they possess them. Although the legitimacy of using chemical, nuclear and biological weapons is debated by contemporary jurists and international treaties on the use of such weapons have been concluded, they are constantly violated by Western powers (Documents on the Laws of War, pp. 29, 35, 137, 377; Yaman, War in the Islamic Law of States, pp. 117-120). 3. It is legitimate to resort to tricks of war for military purposes or to deceive the enemy. The Prophet’s statement, “War is deceit” (Bukhārī, “Jihād”, 157; Muslim, “Jihād”, 18; Tirmidhī, “Jihād”, 5), shows that it is necessary to be vigilant in war and not to lose caution, and that tricks can be used to confuse the other side. Islamic scholars agree that every possible deception can be used in this context, provided that it does not violate the treaty and does not violate the emanation given. This point is also accepted in Article 24 of the Hague Regulations (Meray, II, 456). 4. It is forbidden to kill women, children, the mentally ill, the handicapped, the sick, the elderly, clergymen in seclusion in shrines, and farmers, labourers and businessmen carrying out their own business, who do not personally or indirectly contribute to the war. With the recommendations of the Messenger of Allah to reduce deaths in wars as much as possible (Serahsī, Sharḥ al-Siyari al-kabīr, I, 78-79; Shawkanī, VIII, 71 ff. ), his saying “Muslims are the most forgiving of people in terms of killing” (Musnad, I, 393; Abū Dāwūd, “Jihād”, 110; Ibn Māja, “Diyāt”, 30), and the view that everyone except women and children could be killed (Māwardī, p. 50; Ibn al-ʿArabī, I, 109; Shams al-Dīn al-Ramlī, VIII, 64) show that it is open to discussion. 5. It is forbidden to burn enemy soldiers or mutilate their corpses (Bukhārī, “Jihād”, 149; Muslim, “Jihād”, 3). 6. It is forbidden to rape the women of the enemy and to have illicit relations with them; in fact, according to some sects, it is punishable by hadd. 7. Even if the other side kills Muslim hostages, it is forbidden to kill enemy hostages according to the principle of individuality of the offence (Abū Ya’lā al-Farrā, p. 48; Serahsī, al-Mabsūṭ, X, 169). 8. In accordance with the warnings of the Messenger of Allah, “He who plunders is not one of us” (Abū Dāwūd, “Ḥudūd”, 14; Tirmidhī, “Siyar”, 40) and “Plunder is forbidden just like eating the flesh of unclean animals” (Abū Dāwūd, “Jihād”, 128), plundering is strictly forbidden. 9. According to the majority, it is not right to destroy plant tissue and other living beings, except in order to fulfil the need for nutrition or to break the enemy’s fighting power, or in case of operational necessity (al-Hashr 59/5; Sahnūn, II, 8; Serahsī, Sharḥ al-Siyari al-kabīr, I, 52-55; Ibn Qudāma, X, 509). 10. Destroying strategic positions, fortified places such as fortresses, etc., setting them on fire, and flooding them are permitted within the framework of the necessities of war (al-Hashr 59/2). Likewise, it is permissible to cut or render unusable the enemy’s water channels, as seen in the battles of Badr and Khaybar. 11. If the enemy uses his own women and children or Muslim prisoners as shields, then all the jurists agree that the battle should be fought at the lowest intensity due to the fear that they may also be hit. However, there is disagreement as to the degree of intensity. Some scholars have stated that the aforementioned trenches may be targeted in order to prevent the enemy from making it a method of warfare, while the majority have stated that it may be resorted to only if the Muslims will be defeated or suffer greater harm if the battle is not continued. 12. It is accepted by the majority of jurists that any non-Muslim, regardless of gender or age, can be taken prisoner during the war or at the end of the war if a treaty of dhimmitude has not been signed (al-Anfal 8/67-69; Muhammad 47/4). However, it is forbidden to ill-treat the captives, and it is requested to take care of their shelter and nutrition, not to separate their family members from each other, and to be especially careful about the honour of female captives (see: CAPTIVE).

The End of the War. The war ends in one of the following ways: the other side’s acceptance of Islam or surrender, the conquest, the signing of a peace treaty with or without duration, the signing of a truce treaty to apply for arbitration, the defeat of the Muslims or the cessation of the war. Islamic jurists have determined detailed provisions for each of these situations and have taken care not to shift the issue outside the scope of the law. There is a consensus that it is not permissible for Muslims to conclude a treaty of armistice when they are in a position to win the war (Muhammad 47/35) unless there is a necessity or benefit for them. The majority of Islamic jurists have a tendency to limit the duration of truce or final peace treaties to ten years, taking the Treaty of Hudaybiyah as an example. The Hanafīs, who say that the duration of the treaties will be determined according to the balance of benefit and loss, foresee that this period can be exceeded if the conditions require it (al-Māwardī, p. 63; al-Qāsānī, VII, 109; Burhān al-Dīn al-Mergīnānī, II, 138; also see. SULH). Arbitration, which is a valid method of war termination in terms of Islamic law (Abū Dāwūd, “Jihād”, 82; Ibn Māja, “Jihād”, 38; Abū Yūsuf, p. 218), was also included in Article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention (Çelik, II, 345, 352). In the event that the war ends with the defeat of the Muslims, treaties containing conditions such as paying war indemnity, paying taxes, etc. can be signed in order to protect the Muslim existence (Abū Yūsuf, p. 225; Ibn Rushd, I, 313). If an Islamic country is invaded without any treaty, then the enemy will have property rights over the movable and immovable property of the Muslims according to the majority except for Shafi’i, Zahirites and Zaydis (Wahba ez-Zuhaylī, p. 743). There is a difference of opinion about the status of the country. The mujtahids belonging to the Mālikī and Hanbalī sects and Abū Yūsuf and Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī of the Hanafīs said that an Islamic country that falls into the hands of the enemy will turn into a dār al-Islam when the provisions of kufr begin to be applied there, while Abū Hanīfa linked this to the realisation of three different conditions together, and Shāfi’ī stated that such a transformation cannot occur and that the country will never lose its dār al-Islam characteristic (bk. DARULISLIM; Özel, p. 99 et seq.; Yaman, War in the Law of Islamic States, pp. 163-164).

In Islam, the legitimacy of war, which is not only one of the greatest destructions that humanity can face, but also a reality arising from human nature, has been emphasised, measures have been envisaged to keep it within the framework of law, to limit its destruction and to reduce it as much as possible, special importance has been given to the distinction between combatants and civilians, and there has been no hesitation in adopting international practices that have become customary within the framework of the idea of justice. It is noteworthy in terms of both the history of general law and the history of the law of states that Muslim scholars developed concrete rules, which were also sanctioned, by allocating a special section to this subject in the first works of fiqh and by writing separate works on the law of states in the early period.

Author: AHMET YAMAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Yahyā b. ‘Adam, Kitāb al-Ḫarāj, Cairo, ts. (Dār al-ṭurās), pp. 28-29, 47-48.

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a.mlf., Aḥkām al-Ḳurʾān (ed. Abū Usāme Izzat al-Attār), Beirut 1410/1990, pp. 351, 390, 402.

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Cessās, Aḥkām al-Ḳurʾān, I, 257, 260-261; III, 70.

Māverdī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, Beirut 1405/1985, pp. 41, 44, 50, 63.

Ahmad b. Husayn al-Bayhaqakī, al-Sunan al-qubrā, Hyderābād 1356, IX, 10-13, 21-26.

Ibn Hazm, al-Muḥallā, VII, 291-296; XII, 524.

Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya (ed. M. Hāmid al-Fiqī), Beirut 1403/1983, pp. 39, 48.

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Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām al-Ḳurʾān (ed. Ali M. al-Bijāwī), Cairo 1394/1974, I, 99, 102, 109; II, 876.

Qāṣānī, Bedāʾiʿ, V, 81; VII, 97, 98, 100, 109, 112.

Burhān al-Dīn al-Mergīnānī, al-Hidāya, Istanbul 1986, II, 135, 138.

Ibn Rushd, Bidâyet al-mujtahid, Istanbul 1985, I, 307, 313, 327.

Ibn Qudāma, al-Muġnī, X, 364-368, 509, 543.

Qurtubī, al-Jāmiʿ, II, 353-354; VIII, 109; XII, 69.

‘Abdullah b. Mahmūd al-Mawslī, al-Iḫtiyār li-taʿlīli al-Muḫtār (ed. Mahmūd Abū Dakīka), Cairo 1370/1951, IV, 120; V, 28.

Taqiyy al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyāset al-sharʿiyya, Cairo 1399, pp. 59-60, 62.

Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Aḥkām al-ẕ-ẕimme (ed. Subhī al-Sālih), Beirut 1983, I, 11; III, 7.

Abū al-Fidā Ibn Kathīr, Muḫtaṣaru Tafsīr Ibn Katẖīr (ed. M. ‘Ali al-Sābūnī), Beirut 1402/1981, I, 414; II, 123.

Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimah (tr. Zakir Qadiri Ugan), Istanbul 1989, II, 37, 38.

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Muhammad b. ‘Abdullah al-Harashi, Sharḥ al-Muḫtaṣari Ḫalīl, Beirut, ts. (Dāru Sādır), III, 109, 112-115, 150.

Shawkanī, Nayl al-awṭār, Beirut 1973, VIII, 71 et seq.

Najīb al-Armanāzī, al-Sharʿ al-dawlī fi al-Islam, Damascus 1930, p. 75.

Muammer Raşit Seviğ, General Law of Private States, Istanbul 1945, pp. 123-131, 151, 155, 157.

Zeki Mesud Alsan, Yeni Devletler Hukuku, Ankara 1950, pp. 134-135.

Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore 1955, op. cit.

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I. Goldziher, al-ʿAḳīda wa al-sharīʿa fi al-Islam (tr. M. Yūsuf Mūsā et al.), Cairo 1959, pp. 27, 106, 125.

Seha L. Meray, Introduction to the Law of States, Ankara 1965, II, 280, 389, 440, 456, 579-594.

Muhammad Hamīdullah, State Administration in Islam (trc. Kemal Kuşcu), Istanbul 1963, ibid.

H. Grotius, Law of War and Peace (trc. Seha L. Meray), Ankara 1967, pp. 11, 17, 56, 179-243.

J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford 1971, p. 130.

ʿAli ʿAlī Mansūr, al-Sharīʿat al-Islamiyya wa’l-ḳānūn al-devliyy al-ʿām, Cairo 1390/1971, pp. 279, 316, 350.

Kamil Salāma al-Daks, al-ʿAlaḳāt al-dawliyya fi al-Islam ʿalā ḍawʾi al-iʿjāzi al-bayānī fī sūrat al-Tawbah, Jeddah 1976, pp. 102, 143, 638.

Ahmet Reşit Turnagil, Islam and the Law of Nations, Istanbul 1977, pp. 152-153, 162, 252.

H. Kruse, Islamische Völkerrechtslehre, Bochum 1979, p. 170.

Wahba ez-Zuhaylî, Âs̱ârü’l-ḥarb fi’l-fıḳhi’l-Islâmî, Dımaşk 1981, ibid.

Ahmet Özel, International Relations and the Concept of Country in Islamic Law, Istanbul 1982, pp. 42-44, 48, 50-57, 99 et seq.

Ārif Khalīl Abū ʿĀd, al-ʿAlaḳāt al-ḫāriciyya fī state al-ḫilāfa, Kuwayt 1983, pp. 93, 159, 198.

Abd al-Hamīd Ahmad Abū Sulayman, Islam’s Theory of International Relations (tr. Fehmi Koru), Istanbul 1985, pp. 47, 60, 131.

Edip Çelik, International Law, Istanbul 1987, I, 141-156; II, 320 et seq., 345, 352.

Documents on the Laws of War (ed. A. Roberts – R. Guelff), Oxford 1989, pp. 29, 35, 137, 377.

K. Armstrong, Holy War: The Crusades and their Impact on Today’s World, London 1992, p. 1.

Enver Bozkurt, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Hukuk Mevzuatı, Ankara 1992, pp. 347-349, 387-391, 502 et seq.

Muhammad Hayr Heykel, al-Ḳitāl wa al-jihād fi al-siyāseti al-sharʿiyya, Beirut 1993, ibid.

Tayyar Arı, Introduction to International Relations, Istanbul 1996, pp. 250-263.

Ahmet Yaman, International Relations in Islamic Law, Ankara 1998, pp. 111-127.

a.mlf., War in the Islamic Law of States, Istanbul 1998, ibid.

M. Boisard, “The Conduct of Hostilities and the Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflicts in Islam”, HI, I/2 (1978), pp. 6, 8.